(S)ymbolic Projection:
The Contested Symmetries of Language and Form
Through projection, symbolic language and symbolic form find a connection in space. By overlapping symbolic language and symbolic form onto the same cartesian construct, the Trickster— a linguistic character of Black vernacular and mischief — reveals a suppressed projective system that produces a doubling of meaning or (mis)interpretation of a hidden three-dimensional space. This “space”, containing both symbolic language and form, is where a new symbolic architecture might exist or be developed. This paper follows the trajectory of both language and form, as they are “projected” onto a cartesian construct, first as conventions before focusing on their symbolic counterparts in order to reveal the hidden space of symbolic architecture.
Looking first to language, Ferdinand de Saussure in the Course in General Linguistics, describes and diagrams the linguistic sign as a part of what he calls the sign system. At its most basic, this sign system is a transactional relationship between two people involving aspects of vocalization and hearing (fig,1 & 2).[i]Now according to Saussure, the “linguistic sign [is not] a link between a thing and a name, but [rather a relationship] between a concept [or signified] and a sound pattern [or signifier].”[ii](fig. 3).
To Saussure, the linguistic sign remains fixed to the synchronic, or semantic line with some level of hesitation towards the intersecting line of the diachronic, or line of arbitrariness, hence the significance of stating that “a word need not give rise to any misunderstanding.”[iii]Additionally, the “linguistic sign thus defined has two fundamental characteristics.”[iv]The first is that the linguistic sign is arbitrary and plays an important role in language, as we will see in the coming paragraphs. The second characteristic is that because "the linguistic signal, being auditory in nature, [it] has a temporal aspect, and hence certain temporal characteristics: (a) it occupies a certain temporal space, and (b) this space is measured in just one dimension: it is a line."[v]Put another way, Saussure uses the synchronic as the x-direction and the diachronic as the y-direction in a cartesian construct. The linguistic sign as temporal space that is measured in a one-dimensional line is evidence of a cartesian unit (x, y). (fig. 4). Therefore, language, as Saussure describes it, is spatial. However, despite being directed to or at an individual, language is just a line and requires another element, perhaps another line, to be located in space.
Fortunately, Henry Louis Gates, in the book The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary Criticism, intentionally builds upon this shortcoming by understanding Saussure’s explanation of conventional language and adapting it to the more dynamic symbolic language of the Black vernacular. Gates starts by
thinking about the black concept of Signifyin(g) [as] a bit like stumbling unaware into a hall of mirrors: the sign itself appears to be doubled, at the very least, and (re)doubled upon ever closer examination. It is not the sign itself, however, which has multiplied. If orientation prevails over madness, we soon realize that only the signifier has been doubled and (re)doubled, a signifier in this instance that is silent, a “sound-image” as Saussure defines the signifier, but a “sound-image” sans the sound. The difficulty that we experience when thinking about the nature of the visual (re)doubling at work in a hall of mirrors is analogous to the difficulty we shall encounter in relating the black linguistic sign, “Signification,” to the standard English sign, “signification.[vi]
Put another way, the signification of a concept and sound-image of Saussure’s conventional language is replaced with the (S)ignification of rhetorical figures and signifier, respectively. (fig 5). Using the same word, with the only difference being the state of initial ‘s,’ Gates inscribes the “relationship that black ‘Signification’ bears to the English ‘signification’ is, paradoxically, a relation of difference inscribed within a relation of identity.”[vii]To Gates,
the signifier ‘Signification’ has remained identical in spelling to its white counterpart to demonstrate, first, that a simultaneous, but negated, parallel discursive (ontological, political) universe exists within the larger white discursive universe, like the matter-and-antimatter fabulations so common to science fiction. The play of doubles here occurs precisely on the axes, on the threshold or at Esu’s crossroads, where black and white semantic fields collide. We can imagine the relationship of these two discursive universes as depicted in [fig 6]. Parallel universes, then, is an inappropriate metaphor; perpendicularuniverses is perhaps a more accurate visual description.[viii]
With this adaptation of Saussure’s diagram, Gates overlays, or more appropriately doubles, a Cartesian spatial system of language “whereas signification operates and can be represented on a syntagmatic or horizontal axis, while Signifyin(g) operates and can be represented on a paradigmatic or vertical axis.”[ix]Gates continues to describe this spatial exuberance by stating that
Signification luxuriates in the inclusion of the free play of [the] associative rhetorical and semantic relations. Jacques Lacan calls these vertically suspended associations.
To be clear, when Gates depicts signifyin(g) as suspended vertically, his diagram remains flat. Therefore, these lines can be thought of as orthographic planes where the z-axis, which we will return to shortly, is hidden and allows one to move ‘spatially’ but fixed to the two-dimensions. Additionally, with (S)ignification occurring precisely on the axes, it is also where
the critic of comparative black literature also dwells. [A]t a sort of crossroads, a discursive crossroads at which two languages meet, be these languages Yoruba and English, or Spanish and French, or even (perhaps especially) the black vernacular and standard English.[x]
This critic, Gates mentions, is Esu, the Signifying Monkey, and the Trickster. However, from now on the Trickster will be the preferred designation, and due to its strategic position at the nexus of the aforementioned planes, it knows how to adapt and, more interestingly, manipulate both conventional language and Black vernacular systems. This gives the Trickster the agency to present one thing but mean another or rather to allow whomever, whenever to go stumbling unaware into a hall of mirrors.
In the terms discussed so far, despite the addition of the Trickster, verbal descriptions of a cartesian spatial construct of language, and a supplementary flat diagram, Gates is still unable to make the spatial jump off of the horizontal (synchronic, semantic, or standard English) and vertical (diachronic, rhetorical, or Black vernacular) planar lines of language. This space off of the plane is left for the more adept spatial disciplines, and the mechanism that allows for this transition is hinted at in Architecture in Black: Theory, Space, and Appearance by Darell W. Fields. Much like how Gates adapts Saussure diagrams, Fields takes Gates's verbal, spatial descriptions, and projects them out of the planar diagram. Fields reaffirms this inevitable transformation by stating that “similar to Saussure, Gates linguistic motivations, at the level of diagrammatic representation, acknowledge and suppress the hidden panchronic state—a ‘z-axis’ implicit in the Cartesian (x, y, z) schema. This is a clear demonstration where language displaces Gate’s spatial thinking. He cannot comprehend the linguistic crossover moves without intuitive spatial dexterity.”[xi]He then goes on to add
that both Saussure and Gates use a spatial Cartesian schema that must be fixed at the planar limits of language verifies the significance of the panchronic state. A theory representing a ‘three-dimensional’ language, of which the black vernacular is, must not be confined to a two-dimensional schema. A required formal diagrammatic adjustment shifts black (linguistics) vernacular to black (spatial) architectonic.[xii]
This adjustment is the realization of the panchronic line, or as Fields labels it in his diagram, the axis of projection (fig 7). The addition of this z-axis introduces the Black vernacular of language to the spatial proclivities of architecture through projection. Looking back to Gates, doubling via the Trickster and its hall of mirrors is synonymous with the act of projecting. However, if orientation prevails over madness, as Gates predicts, an understanding of projection as it relates to the spatial relationship between the eye and form (or objects in the world) needs to be explained.
In Perspective as Symbolic Form, Erwin Panofsky describes, and more importantly diagrams, the projection method related to the artist’s (or more simply human) eye and how that projection is perceived as visual information inscribed into an artwork. Put more simply, this space and the relationship that occurs between the subject and form(s) is bisected by what Panofsky describes as a “picture plane [and] upon this picture plane is projected the spatial continuum which is seen through it and which is understood to contain all the various individual objects.”[xiii](fig 8). This “picture – in accord with the ‘window’ definition – [is an invisible] planar cross section through the so-called visual pyramid; the apex of this pyramid is the eye, which is then connected with [the] individual points [from objects] within the space to be represented.”[xiv]Robin Evans, in The Projective Cast: Architecture and Its Three Geometries, further adds to this concept by describing the “parallels - conservers of true measure – are most readily understood to be representations of light paths [or lines of light] and understood to be remoteness, one way or another, because either the light source projecting the information or the eye receiving it has to be imagined at an infinite distance.”[xv]This is best illustrated in figure 9. Titled “The Principles of Parallel Projection”, from Daniel Fournier, A Treatise on the Theory of Perspective, the object in the bottom half of the image projects its form via parallel lines onto the plane to the right producing a ‘flat’ image. It is important to state that this spatial system consists of two planes. The x-plane or horizon/ground and the y-plane.
With this understanding of formal (orthogonal) projection that subdues the z-axis, two critical questions of proportions can be explained as it relates specifically to Ancient Egypt's symbolic form. Revolving around what Panofsky describes as the “theory of human measurements,”[xvi]the “first is a question of ‘objective’ proportions – a question whose answer precedes the artistic activity. The second is a question of ‘technical’ proportions – a question whose answer lies in the artistic process itself…”[xvii]These questions proposed a total of “three fundamentally different possibilities [when] pursuing [the] ‘theory of human measurements.’”[xviii]Panofsky goes on to describe it as the following:
This theory could aim either at the establishment of the “objective” proportions, without troubling itself about their relationship to the “technical”; or at the establishment of the “technical” proportions, without troubling itself about the relation to the “objective”; or finally, it could consider itself exempt from either choice viz., where “technical” and “objective” proportions coincide with each other.
The last-mentioned possibility was realized, in pure form, only once: in Egyptian Art.[xix]
According to Panofsky, Egyptian art was able to do this because it ignored changes to dimensions caused by movements, foreshortening due to artists position relative to the subject, and another level of foreshortening due to the potential beholder.[xx]In short, the form(s) projected is not of a specific view. Meaning there are no perspectival qualities to the projection, rendering it as just. Like a geometrical plan, “all the parts of the [form] are so arrayed that they present themselves either in a completely frontal projection [elevation] or else in pure profile [plan or section].”[xxi](fig 10).
Interestingly, when looking back to Perspective as Symbolic Form, Panofsky at first concedes to the power perspective as a “translation of psychophysiological space into mathematical space; [or] in other words, an objectification of the subjective.”[xxii] However, immediately after, he states that
this formula also suggests that as soon as perspective ceased to be a technical and mathematical problem, it was bound to become all that much more of an artistic problem.[xxiii]
Now, by understanding the significance of this distinction, it is at this point to mention Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and his Aesthetics from a series of Lectures on Fine Art. For Hegel, the father of modern history, in his idealized world “the [symbolic] form of art is…a mere search for portrayal than a capacity for true presentation.” [xxiv]He then goes on to speak directly about Egypt when describing the characteristics of symbolic form of art by stating that
symbolic art, both in its special content and in its form, we have to seek in Egypt. Egypt is the country of symbols, the country which sets itself the spiritual task of the self-deciphering of the spirit, without actually attaining to the decipherment. The problems remain unsolved…For this reason the Egyptians, amongst the peoples hitherto mentioned, are the properly artistic people.[xxv]
This of course is not the case. As it was already mentioned, Egyptian Art is the pure form of art. Its mathematical ingenuity and absence of perspectival foreshortening render the art as true projections. In fact, for this reason, the Ancient Egyptian method of projection is supported “quite logically [by] Plato [when he] contrasts ‘undisciplined’ Greek art with the ‘law-bound’ art of the Egyptians, whose works, always conceived in the same style, were no more beautiful and no uglier in [his] own time than they had been ten thousand years before.”[xxvi] Therefore, when Hegel describes Egypt’s symbolic form of art as a mere search for portrayal than a capacity for true presentation or its people as artistic it resonates from an ideological point of view and not one of logic or reason. Egyptian form and its projections are then historically situated as a symbolic form of greater importance than the canonized Greek by a Greek. It is at this point, with the induction of Egypt’s symbolic form via projection, to state that it is not only objects that project through the picture plane.
As it has already been mentioned, the linguistic sign and respectively language, specifically the Black vernacular, is a line that takes up some amount of space, and like lines of light, it has the ability to be projected. What is missing then is the physical, or even meta-physical, space between. Fortunately, the Trickster orients himself off the ground and into space in the following lines:
“Deep down in the jungle so they say
There’s a signifying [trickster] down the way
There hadn’t been no disturbin’ in the jungle for quite a bit,
For up jumped the [trickster] in the tree one day and laughed
“I guess I’ll start some shit.”[xxvii]
The Lion reinforces the Tricksters perch in the tree above and more importantly his ability to signify by calling out to him from the jungle floor.
“[Trickster,]” said the Lion,
Beat to his unbooted knees,
“You and your signifying children
Better stay up in the trees.”
Which is why today
Trickster does his signifying
A-way-up out of the way.[xxviii]
Fortunately, the Lion is unable to recognize the difference between signifying, or literal meaning, and Signifyin(g), or rhetorical meaning. This is key. According to Gates, “it is this relationship between the literal and figurative, and the dire consequences of their confusion, which is the most striking repeated elements of these tales. The [Trickster’s] trick, [as it were], depends on the Lion’s inability to mediate between these two poles of signification, of meaning.”[xxix]
Therefore, from up in the tree, the Trickster is able to do three things simultaneously. He is able to survey the rest of the jungle, receive and understand information and most importantly project this information as his own form of “mediation—or, more properly, antimediation—[as] a play on language use in order to produce a desired outcome.”[xxx]This linguistic projection, which is projected onto the x,y, and hidden z of the jungle, is demonstrated by the Trickster when he “succeeds in reversing the Lion’s status by supposedly repeating a series of insults purportedly uttered by the Elephant about the Lion’s closest relatives (his wife, his ‘mama,’ his ‘grandmama, too!’)).”[xxxi]The effect of which causes "the self-confident but unassuming Elephant, after politely suggesting to the Lion he must be mistaken, to trounce the Lion firmly.”[xxxii]Thus, we find ourselves with two three-dimensional spatial systems based on an ‘identical’ x-y plane with projection. One is constructed out of symbolic language with a figure at its intersection that can project, and another is out of a foundation of geometry that produces symbolic formal projections. (fig 11).
At this moment, a confluence of these two spatial systems over each other can happen. By rotating the Black vernacular around the x-axis and effectively doubling the diachronic, both symbolic language and symbolic form intersect infinitely along these planes. The only aspect providing any variance in this doubled system is the Trickster at the intersection. Here, “given the play of doubles at work in the black appropriation of the [standard]-language term that denotes relations of meaning, the [Trickster] and his language of Signifyin(g) are extraordinary conventions, with Signification standing as the term for black rhetoric, the obscuring of apparent meaning.”[xxxiii]In other words, by understanding the rules or regulations of both planes of language, it is not far off to assume that the Trickster would also know how to manipulate the rules and regulations of the symbolic formal projection planes. (fig 12).
Consider, again, the skills of the Trickster and its orientation to the world. The first is his ability to survey the rest of the jungle from the safety of the tree. If the tree is projecting out of the x-y plane or ground-plane as a vertical distance above, it can then be said that from here, in the tree, the Trickster is looking or seeing the horizon. This horizon, as it has already been stated, is crucial for the line of true measurement and convergence, which is an aspect of perspectives that will be discussed later in greater detail. The next skill is the efficiency at which the Trickster is able to receive and process information. Like a picture plane receiving light, the Tricksters position relative to the Lion, for example, gives the Trickster a powerful advantage. He is in control of the invisible window from which the Lion perceives information and is able to transmit it seamlessly without fail. Therefore, by being in control of all inputs and outputs, both literal and figurative, the last, and most important skill is the Tricksters ability manipulate this information without alarming the subject. For these reasons, by overlapping the mechanisms of projection of both symbolic language and symbolic form, the Trickster is able to produce double meaning or (mis)interpretations in the form of a new symbolic architecture.
At this point I will be looking to Contested Symmetries and Other Predicaments in Architecture by Preston Scott Cohen in an effort to illustrate this dynamic superimposed system. According to Cohen,
the development of the flatfish (heterosomata) provides a good illustration of the kind of motivated strangeness architects today so rarely confront in their work. Like most fish, the flatfish begins by swimming with the axis of its body perpendicular to the ocean floor, one eye on either side of its symmetrical body. But as this fish matures, its feeding habits require it to swim close to the bottom of the ocean. So the flatfish adapts. As it swims, progressively closer to the ocean floor, its body gradually rotates to a position parallel to the floor surface, while the eye that would otherwise face the dark ocean surface slowly migrates to the ‘top’ side of its body. A mature fish, then, swims parallel to the ocean floor, both eyes on one side of its face. (fig 13). And for those of us who expect symmetry in our fish, this is somewhat disturbing.[xxxiv]
This strict adherence to planarity, or rather true orthogonality, resonates with both of the aforementioned cartesian systems of symbolic language and symbolic form. The strangeness or somewhat disturbing feeling described by Cohen, however, is rather a result of one’s perspective.
Up until this point, perspective has always been referenced but never a true agent in the pure orthogonal system that has been set up thus far. With this in mind then, Brook Taylor’s two-point linear perspective can be injected into the linguistic-form cartesian construct. According to Cohen, “Taylor’s [two-point linear perspective shows] that behind his [method] lies a [hidden] three-dimensional projective process that rotates and inverts the object being projected. Two symmetrically opposite projections result, orthographic and perspectival, each a distortion of the other. Thus, projection is shown to produce an episode of regularly-occurring distortion.”[xxxv](fig 14). When considering the Trickster and the Lion’s scuffle, the Trickster had to know the Lion’s perspective in order to act upon his own perspective. Already knowing the ending, it is apparent that the picture plane of the Lion, without his knowledge due to the Trickster’s clever Signifyin(g), is doubled, or at the very least overlapped due to the true object (in this case language) being rotated and inverted. From the Lions perspective it understands, believes, and sees what is said to be true based on semantics, or rather true orthographic projection, when in fact the Trickster has distorted the true projection using rhetoric, effectively masquerading new meaning within the hidden z-axis.
The same outcome Is also true for the symbolic form, with two key distinctions. First, when looking to Cohen’s computer-generated model of Taylor’s two-point linear perspective, the ‘eye’ or Lion in this case, despite its clear importance in the set-up of the model, is not the focus of this observation. It is rather the operation itself, a mechanism at which two symmetrically opposite projections, orthographic and perspectival, result in a distortion of the other. The second distinction is that the two symmetrically opposite projections are like that of Egypt; a symbolic form in pure projection. In other words, this system is a diagrammatic representation of the Trickster’s manipulation, rotation and inversion of a symbolic objects (forms). The result of which
collapses three-dimensional objects and projections into two-dimensional plane surfaces serendipitously [to create] a type of distorted symmetry. The process by which three-dimensional operations of projection unfold into two dimensions require reversing the object by rotating it relative to its perspective projection. When projected two dimensionally, this process links objects and perspective of objects along a ‘ground line’ – a line of intersection between the picture plane and a reference plane parallel to the horizon. Bound and reversed along this shared axis, it is possible to interpret the two projections of the object – one orthographic and the other perspectival – as mutually distorted and inverted versions of the same primary, three-dimensional object.[xxxvi]
Like Fields’ recognition of Gates’ suppression of a projective language system, Cohen’s examination of Taylor’s method reveals a hidden three-dimensional system suppressed by a two-dimensional one in projection. This subduing produces a doubled reading. To the Lion, this technique masquerades a distorted object in projection due to its inability to shift off of the semantic, orthographic orientation line. For the Trickster, the one in control of the operation, or rather is the operation, the symbolic object has been changed but retains its connotation (fig. 15). These two outcomes are the difference between symbolic projection and (S)ymbolic projection, respectively, and like Gates explanation of signification versus (S)ignification, the phrase symbolic projection retains its spelling except for the state of the initial ‘s.’ This is because it too demonstrates that a parallel discursive (ontological, political) universe exists within the larger white discursive universe. Despite the production of a symmetrically distorted three-dimensional object, the Lion can only see the literal projection much like how a plan hides a section.
By starting with language, or perhaps more appropriately, the linguistic sign, Gates intentionally projects onto Saussure’s diagrams to re-represent the black vernacular more accurately from “within” the standard English x-y cartesian schema. To convey this discovery, Gates used spatial vocabulary to further distinguish the rhetorical distance between standard language and the Black vernacular. However, without any spatial aptitude, Gates instead doubles the cartesian framework through (S)ignification and represents it as a flat diagram, unfortunately hiding the z-axis of projection. Thankfully, Fields expands on Saussure’s descriptions of the panchronic, by describing the flatness of Gates’ diagram as an axis projection out of the conventional language planar cartesian construct. From there, in space, so to speak, projection is explored. First, at a more fundamental understanding to orient oneself in space before discovering the particular projection method used by the Ancient Egyptians. In doing so, both the system of symbolic language and symbolic form end up mimicking each other. This awards a confluence of the two systems, which is then tested with the addition of one’s perspective via Cohens representation of Taylor’s two-point linear perspective. As a result, the differences between symbolic projection and (S)ymbolic projection expose the contested symmetries of both language and form, revealing a hidden space where a new symbolic architecture might exist or be developed.
[i] Saussure, Ferdinand de. “Linguistic Structure: Its place among the facts of language.” Course in General Linguistics. p 13. Translated by Roy Harris. New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2013
[ii] Saussure, Ferdinand de. “Sign, signification, signal.” Course in General Linguistics. p 76. Translated by Roy Harris. New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2013.
[iii] Saussure, Ferdinand de. “Sign, signification, signal.” Course in General Linguistics. p 76-77. Translated by Roy Harris. New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2013.
[iv] Ibid. p 78.
[v] Saussure, Ferdinand de. “Second principal: Linear character of the signal.” Course in General Linguistics. p 80. Translated by Roy Harris. New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2013.
[vi] Gates, Henry Louis. “The Signifying Monkey and Language of Signifyin(g): Rhetorical Difference and the Orders of Meaning.” Essay. In The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary Criticism, p 49. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
[vii] Gates, Henry Louis. “The Signifying Monkey and Language of Signifyin(g): Rhetorical Difference and the Orders of Meaning.” Essay. In The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary Criticism, p 50. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
[viii] Ibid. p 54.
[ix] Ibid. p 54.
[x] Ibid. p 71.
[xi] Fields, Darell Wayne. “Architecture and the Classical (P)eriod.” Essay. In Architecture in Black: Theory, Space and Appearance, p 175. London, NY: Bloomsbury, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2016.
[xii] Ibid. p 175-76.
[xiii] Panofsky, Erwin. Perspective as Symbolic Form. New York: Zone, 1997. p 27.
[xiv] Ibid. p 28.
[xv] Evans, Robin. “Seeing through Paper.” The Projective Cast: Architecture and Its Three Geometries. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. p 108.
[xvi] Panofsky, Erwin. “The History of the Theory of Human Proportions as a Reflection of the History of Styles.” Essay. In Meaning in the Visual Arts, p 57. Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1955.
[xvii] Ibid. p 56-57.
[xviii] Ibid. p 57.
[xix] Ibid. p 57.
[xx] Panofsky, Erwin. “The History of the Theory of Human Proportions as a Reflection of the History of Styles.” Essay. In Meaning in the Visual Arts, p 57. Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1955.
[xxi] Ibid. p 58.
[xxii] Panofsky, Erwin. Perspective as Symbolic Form. New York: Zone, 1997. p 66.
[xxiii] Ibid. p 67.
[xxiv] Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. “Introduction.” Essay. In Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, p 76. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975
[xxv] Ibid. p. 354.
[xxvi] Panofsky, Erwin. “Introduction.” Essay. In cc, p 4. New York, NY: Icon Editions, 1975.
[xxvii] Gates, Henry Louis. “The Signifying Monkey and Language of Signifyin(g): Rhetorical Difference and the Orders of Meaning.” Essay. In The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary Criticism, p 60-61. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014
[xxviii] Ibid. p 61.
[xxix] Ibid. p 61.
[xxx]Ibid. p 61.
[xxxi] Ibid. p 62.
[xxxii] Gates, Henry Louis. “The Signifying Monkey and Language of Signifyin(g): Rhetorical Difference and the Orders of Meaning.” Essay. In The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary Criticism, p 62. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014
[xxxiii] Ibid. p 59.
[xxxiv] Cohen, Preston Scott. “Introduction: Predicaments and Surrogates.” Essay. In Contested Symmetries and Other Predicaments in Architecture, p 12-13. New York, NY: Princeton Architectural Press, 2001.
[xxxv] Cohen, Preston Scott. “Introduction: Predicaments and Surrogates.” Essay. In Contested Symmetries and Other Predicaments in Architecture, p 15. New York, NY: Princeton Architectural Press, 2001.
[xxxvi] Cohen, Preston Scott. “Introduction: Predicaments and Surrogates.” Essay. In Contested Symmetries and Other Predicaments in Architecture, p 55. New York, NY: Princeton Architectural Press, 2001.